T h e first section of this paper considers creativity as eternal object in the abstract. Chapter X of Science and the M o d e r n W o r l d will be our p r i m a r y resource for clarifying the place of the Category of the Ulti m a t e in the logical hierarchy of ideas which constitutes the narrow definition of metaphysical "system. Abstracted f r o m its concrete applications, system takes on the appearance of a completed body of related possibilities open to objective analysis. T h e second section of this paper considers creativity as exemplified in the concrete. This section is necessary to restore the living relevance or g e r m a n e ness of Whitehead's system to the actual world. The ontological analysis of the Category of the Ultimate and especially creativity will aid in clarifying the concrete function of these notions in relation to other elements exemplified in actual occasions.
Creativity In T h e Abstract
Metaphysical S ystem As A Finite Abstractive Hierarchy
In chapter X of Science and the M o d e r n W o r l d , Whitehead rejects the H u m e a n ground for differentiation between mental functioning and physical event. 3 "Abruptness" is chosen as an alternative sign for identifying the presence of cognitive experience in its various f o r m s . 4 Whitehead expresses this in c o m m o n -s e n s e terms, " W e always find that w e have thought of just this--whatever it m a y be--and no more. Complexity is not thereby eliminated f r o m mental experience, only limited as to a m a x i m u m grade in any situation. Whitehead is not quarreling over theory. H e is disputing the accuracy of H u m e ' s description of the facts of mental experience. The above should be applicable to a metaphysical system taken as whole, whether implicitly or explicitly formulated. Th e n the categoreal s c h e m e of P R would s e e m to represent one limited though enviably complex vision of the real. T h e present section will explore this possibility in brief. 
Whitehead defines Speculative
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Cognitive experience, according to Whitehead, necessarily involves a reference to transcendental entities called "eternal objects." The "individual essence" of an eternal object designates its particular individuality. ^ Eternal objects are also internally related to one another by their "relational essences. " The multiplicity of eternal objects is thus described as a R e a l m "because each eternal object has its status in this general systematic complex of mutual related ness. "7 T h e doctrine of internal relations would s e e m to frustrate the pos sibility of finite truth implied in the abrupt character of h u m a n k n o w l edge. "In so far as there are internal relations, everything m u s t depend upon everything else. But if this be the case, w e cannot k n o w about anything till w e equally k n o w everything else. Apparently, therefore, w e are under the necessity of saying everything at once. This supposed necessity is palpably untrue. Accordingly it is in cumbent on us to explain h o w there can be internal relations, seeing that w e admit finite truths.
Whitehead grounds his explanation on the "analytic character" of the r ealm of eternal objects. " B y this character it is mea n t that the status of any eternal object 'A' in this realm is capable of analysis into an indefinite n u m b e r of subordinate relationships of limited scope.
The realm of possibility is void of principles of selection and consequently any division a m o n g relation ships is possible.
A n important qualification m u s t be m a d e in re gard to this doctrine. W e should not lose sight of the fact that every division abstracts f r o m the totality of possible relationships. N o particular division ever exhausts the m e aning or individual essence of an eternal object.
M o r e specifically, division by analysis m e a n s the exhibition of the general s c h e m e of relatedness of eternal objects as a multiplicity of complex eternal objects.^ The individual essence of a complex eternal object is constituted by the individual essences of a definite n u m b e r of component eternal objects. " A definite finite relationship involving the definite eternal objects of a limited set of such objects is itself an eternal object: it is those eternal objects as in that relationship. I will call such an eternal object 'complex. ' T h e eternal objects which are the relata in a complex eternal object will be called the 'components' of that eternal object.
T h e complexity of an eternal object is thus exhibited by its analysis into a relationship of component eternal objects. These in turn m a y be complex. T h e process of winnowing reduction continues until the grade of simple eternal objects is reached. ^3 A simple eternal object is defined negatively as that which is not analyzable into a relation ship of component eternal objects. Such a pattern of interconnected complexities based on a group of simple eternal objects defines an "abstractive hierarchy. " "Thus an abstractive hierarchy springs f r o m its base; it includes every successive grade f r o m its base either indefinitely onwards, or to its m a x i m u m grade; and it is 'connected' by the reappearance in a higher grade of any set of its m e m b e r s belonging to lower grades, in the function of a set of components or derivative components of at least one m e m b e r of the hierarchy."^4 Should progress in thought through successive grades of increasing complexity stop with a complex eternal object of a definite grade, then w e are dealing with a "finite abstractive hierar chy" with that eternal object as its vertex. This is the case with things apprehended as mental. "But the things apprehended as mental are always subject to the condition that w e c o m e to a stop w h e n w e attempt to explore ever higher grades of complexity in their realised relationships. W e always find that w e have thought of just this--whatever it m a y be--and of no more. There is a limitation which breaks off th^finite concept f r o m the higher grades of illimitable complexity. "
The notion of "system" would s e e m to be a large-scale example of a finite abstractive hierarchy. The categoreal s c h e m e of P R . consid ered as a logically complete system of ideas, represents the finite vision of one philosopher. This m e a n s there is a togetherness of the individual es sences of eternal objects which is inclusive of all degrees of c o m p l e x ity. *7 Consequently, an "infinite abstractive hierarchy" is to be associated with the "physical" existence of an actual occasion.^8 System, then, in principle can only approximate concreteness with its infinite complexity. ' The abstract and the concrete remain distinct ontological orders and never coincide.
S M
T h e history of speculative philosophy testifies to mam's unquench able drive to "explore ever higher grades of complexity" f r o m the shoulders of past achievement. W e as critics can be mistaken about the exact limits of previous explorations. Nevertheless, the possi bility of an objective study of the history of ideas presumes, for example, that Whitehead "thought of just this--whatever it m a y be--and of no more. "20 His description of mental functioning in Chapter X of S M W guarantees at least the theoretical possibility of exhaust ing the m e aning of his finite hierarchical system by logical analysis.
The Concept Of "Being"
Ages of criticism will gradually bring to light the complex eternal object which constitutes the vertex of Whitehead's system. For the time being w e will content ourselves with a brief examination of the foundation on which this hierarchy s e e m s to rest. 
If the categoreal s c h e m e as a whole constitutes a finite abstractive hierarchy, then b e i n g -a s -p r o c e s s^ m a y be identified as an eternal
object of the lowest complex grade. Being-as-process is analysable into the essential components of "creativity, " "many, " and "one. " "Creativity" denotes the unifying, originating, and synthesizing activity in itself. ^7 " M a n y " denotes "disjunctive diversity," or "conditioned potentialities"^® available for synthesis. "One" de notes the "singularity of an entity, " or the "achieved outcome of the synthesis.
In the logical order, these are "ultimate notions . .. presupposed in all the m o r e special categories. "
T h e y are "inexpressible" in terms of simpler or higher universals.
That is, "multiplicity," "creativity," and "unity" are not reducible to any lower grade of complexity. It would s e e m appropriate to describe t h e m as simple eternal objects.
This set of eternal objects of zero complexity m u s t f o r m the base of Whitehead's scheme. All other generic notions logically "spring" f r o m this base.
Being-as-process in itself is a derived notion. T h e individual essences of the three simple objects "constitute"^ the individual essence of being-as-process, the ultimate complex object.
\ 6
This t e r m will be used below as a substitute for "concrescence" or "real actuality." 
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3. The U n iv e r s a l Of U n iv e r s a ls Whitehead applies the t e r m "universal" to eternal objects considered as abstract but necessarily ordered to the concrete. E v e n the mo s t abstract discussion of eternal objects m u s t include at least indeter minate reference to the concrete. " A n eternal object considered in reference to the publicity of things is an'univer sal;1 namely, in its o w n nature it refers to the general public facts of the world without any disclosure of the empirical details of its o w n implication in them. Its o w n nature as an entity requires ingression--positive or negative--in every detailed actuality; but its nature does not disclose the private details of any actuality. 
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'modes. '"57 Spinoza and proponents of absolute idealism m e r e l y offer another variation on the "substance-quality" theme. Applica tion of this the m e to Whitehead's system implies substantializing or reifying creativity. N u m e r o u s texts lend support to the Spinozistic reading of Whitehead. Creativity is said to "introduce" novelty, "originate" each novel situation, "meet" dead datum with vivifyi^ novelty, "poise" before itself possibility, actuality and purpose, as if creativity itself w e r e a concrete actuality in addition to its individualizations.
T h e majority of relevant texts, however, leave no r o o m for such an interpretation of Whitehead's thought. His m a i n intention is ex pressed in statements such as, "creativity is not an external agency with its o w n ulterior purposes. "59 E v e r y actual occasion is causa sui because it brings together the universe by its o w n creative act. 6Û Whitehead transforms Spinoza's " m o d e s " into "sheer actualities; so that, though analysis of t h e m increases our understanding, it does not lead us to the discovery of any higher grade of reality. itself. Rather, it is a factor, 64 or formative element, 65 Q r ultimate principle^ disclosed in the analysis of temporal actual occasions.
T h e Character Of Creativity
Use of the t e r m "character" in Whitehead's descriptions of creativity brings out the unique metaphysical status of this principle. Creativity is no ordinary universal. It is the "universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact.
Whitehead contrasts the concrete role of an eternal object and its abstract reference to the concrete. The t e r m "universal" is appropriate to the latter, "character" to the former. " A n eternal object considered in reference to the privacy of things is a 'quality' or 'characteristic;' namely, in its o w n nature, as exempli fied in any actuality, it constitutes an element in the private definite ness of that actuality. It refers itself publicly; but it is enjoyed privately. E-3
